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"Qantas, Australia's International Airline, brings you these see-
it-your-way tours and the idea is beautifully simple.., and simply
beautiful!
"We fly you to Australia, or to New Zealand in conjunction with
a participating airline. Then we ofler you a variety of ways you
can comfortably enjoy the wonders of each country. . . .Take a
drive-yourself car or, if you want to leave the driving to someone
else, take a plane good for unlimited motorcoach travel or unlimit-
ed rail travel in each country.
. ..No matter which package you choose, transfer on arrival
to your hotel for your first night's stay in Sydney or Auckland...
all included in the tour price."1
In Foremost International Tours v. Qantas Airway, Ltd.,' a pro-
ceeding presently before the Civil Aeronautics Board (the CAB),'
Foremost Tours, a wholesaler of tour programs, is challenging the
actions of Qantas, a foreign air carrier, in producing and selling an
integrated tour package in competition with Foremost. Foremost
alleges that Qantas violated the antitrust laws in its vertical expan-
sion into the tour business.
* J.D., Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School, 1977; B.A., Cornell Univ., College
of Arts & Sciences, 1974. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
George N. Tompkins, Esq., and Michael J. Holland, Esq., in providing research
materials.
1 Qantas Airway, 1976/1977 Australia, New Zealand tours.
'Foremost International Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 88
(D. Hawaii 1974), aff'd, 525 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
957 (1976).
3 Final briefs were submitted to Administrative Law Judge Agerakis in August
1976.
'The Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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Foremost is engaged in the business of packaging, producing,
and operating tour programs to Australia and New Zealand from
the U.S., Canada, and other countries. The tour includes air trans-
portation, hotel accommodations, sightseeing, and land transporta-
tion in Australia and New Zealand. For many years Qantas was a
participating airline in one of Foremost's tours.
In 1967 the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
filed resolutions 81 OD and 81 OE with the CAB pursuant to section
412 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act).' Resolution
810D outlines rules under which IATA members may operate in-
clusive tours for sale by IATA travel agents via IATA member
airlines. Resolution 810E prescribes fees applicable to tour operat-
ors such as Foremost who promote tours for sale by individual
IATA agents via the scheduled services of IATA members such as
Qantas. These general resolutions were approved by the CAB in
Order No. E-24598.'
In 1974 Qantas extended its operations and began producing
and selling integrated tour packages in competition with Foremost.
As required by section 403 of the Act," Qantas filed a tariff con-
taining its group inclusive tour fare. The tariff included an itemized
list of costs of the various tour items.
After Qantas entered the tour business, Foremost's business de-
clined dramatically. For example, in May 1973 Foremost sold 581
tours; in May 1974 it sold only 65 tours.'
The District Court of Hawaii issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining Qantas from engaging in certain prescribed conduct in its
operation of competing integrated tours. The court recognized that
section 411 of the Act' granted the CAB initial jurisdiction over
many of the charges of anticompetitive activity, and therefore
stayed further proceedings until the CAB could consider these
matters. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
5 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. S 1301
et seq., § 1382 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
'Jan. 3, 1967; IATA Inclusive Tours, 46 C.A.B. 838 (1967).
7 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
' Foremost also challenged certain of Qantas' actions as constituting anti-
competitive practices in and of themselves. For the purposes of this paper, these
practices will be discussed only as they pertain to Qantas' vertical expansion into
the tour business.
'49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
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affirmed the decision,"° and the parties are now awaiting a decision
by the CAB. In a preliminary order, the Administrative Law Judge
recognized Qantas' right to conduct its own tour operations.1
This paper will examine the consequences of that order: Should
air carriers in foreign transportation be permitted to conduct in-
house tour operations?
II. THE PARTIES INTERESTED IN Tins DISPUTE
A. Foreign Air Carriers
A foreign air carrier is defined under section 101(19) of the
Act as, "any person, not a citizen of the United States, who under-
takes, whether directly or indirectly or by lease or any other ar-
rangement, to engage in air transportation."'"
The CAB authorizes foreign flag carriers to transport passengers,
property, or mail to and from the United States.13 The President
of the United States has reviewing authority over all certificates
in overseas and foreign transportation." Tariffs must be filed and
observed." The CAB has the power to prohibit any discrimination
in rates" and any unfair methods of competition in "air transpor-
tation or the sale thereof."'" The CAB exercises only indirect con-
trol over the actual rates and other substantive aspects of foreign
air transportation, by suspending and rejecting proposed rates and
by withholding approval of agreements." Once approval of such
agreements is conferred, however, actions pursuant to the agreement
are exempt from the antitrust laws."
10For the purposes of this paper, the Civil Aeronautics Board's jurisdiction
over this matter is assumed.
11 Bureau of Enforcement dismissal pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 302.205 (1977).
The dismissal became the action of the CAB pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 302.20
(1977).
1"49 U.S.C. § 1301(19) (1970). The definition of "air carrier" is similar,
but pertains only to United States citizens. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970).





"I Id. 5 1382. Examples of such other matters include uniform ticket and bag-
gage checks, reservations, deposits, free baggage allowances, delays and can-
cellation of flights. See C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES
250 (1961).
"949 U.S.C. S 1384 (1970).
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International air transportation is controlled by the International
Air Transport Association (IATA), a private association of air
carriers who are authorized to operate scheduled international air
services.2" Regional traffic conferences draft agreements fixing rates,
fares, and other aspects of transportation. These agreements must
be approved unanimously by the general membership and are sub-
ject to review by the governments of the conference members. The
United States air carriers which are authorized to engage in foreign
air transportation participate in this conference and are parties to
such agreements.
B. Tour Operators
Wholesale tour operators are in the business of marketing and
servicing charter tours. Generally, an independent tour operator
canvasses the consumer's demands and assembles a package com-
prised of airline seats, hotel rooms, restaurant services, motorbus
transportation, and related ground services. The tour operator then
offers its tour to the public."'
There are two aspects to this wholesaling business. In general
wholesaling, the tour operator arranges the ground components of
a tour for a particular travel agent, who then promotes the tour
under the agency name and arranges for the air space himself. In
tour packaging, the tour operator designs and contracts for a tour
program with a sponsoring air carrier. A brochure is promoted
jointly by the airline and the tour operator. The inclusive tour pack-
age is marketed by a travel agent and airline ticket offices." The
tour operator does not directly deal with the public.
The market for tour operators is composed of a large number
of independent operators. They compete among themselves in pric-
ing and servicing their tours. New operators can freely enter the
market.'"
Charter tour operators are controlled by the CAB's economic
10 The articles of incorporation of IATA were approved in IATA Traffic Con-
ference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639 (1946).
1 Hearings on S. 2551 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Com-
merce Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1106 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976
Hearings].
" Initial Brief for Complainant at 6, Foremost v. Qantas, CAB Docket No.
27,631 (1976).
s 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 1087.
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regulations. Specific regulations have been promulgated for specific
types of tours.2 ' United States and foreign tour operators are subject
to these provisions and must obtain a permit from the CAB.' How-
ever, foreign tour operators organizing foreign-originating tours
are exempted from the regulations."
The CAB first disclaimed jurisdiction over these foreign tour op-
erators in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB."' In this
case, the CAB recognized that tour operators were indirect air car-
riers!8 and that the CAB had jurisdiction over them. However, the
CAB argued that exercising its jurisdiction would fail to advance
the Act and would tend to frustrate the powers of the CAB and the
President with respect to American supplemental carriers flying in-
clusive tour charters abroad."' The reasons cited by the CAB in-
cluded the facts that: 1) Compliance with licensing procedures
would be an extreme burden for foreign tour operators; 2) Increas-
ed uncertainty in scheduling would discourage tour operations; 3)
Effective reciprocity would be denied; and 4)Regulation would be
unnecessary since it was in the interest of a licensed air carrier to
deal with a financially responsible tour operation."0 In upholding
the CAB and denying jurisdiction, the court, in effect, authorized
the sale and marketing of foreign-originating charters by tour oper-
ator affiliates of foreign air lines."
C. Charter Service
Charter service, as discussed in this article, refers to the entire
bulk transportation market. This market is distinguished from in-
dividually-ticketed service in terms of the character of traffic, not
the type of carrier. Thus, passengers traveling at group rates on
scheduled service are part of the bulk transportation market.'
- 14 C.F.R. § 378 (1977); 14 C.F.R. § 378a (1977).
-49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
- 14 C.F.R. S 378.32 (1977).
27 392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
11 Indirect air carriers charter the aircraft of authorized carriers.
29 392 F.2d at 495.
'Old. at 488.
8 See text accompanying note 91 infra.
"This definition was adopted in the Statement of International Air Trans-
portation Policy of the United States, approved by the President, 6 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 820 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Statement], cited in Licht-
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The United States grants unlimited authority to international
route carriers to perform charter services on their regular certifi-
cated routes. Off-route charter authority is subject to prior CAB
approval. Foreign charter airlines are also granted route authority
by the CAB.'
In the 1970 Statement of International Air Transportation Pol-
icy of the United States which was approved by the President, char-
ter services were described as a most valuable component of the
international air transportation system." This realization evolved
quite slowly. The supplemental air carriers, which perform the ma-
jor charter services for the United States, were originally authorized
as a class of carriers exempt from the Act's economic regulations.'
Economic Regulation 292.1 defined these "nonscheduled" opera-
tions as those where "the air carrier does not hold out to the public
by advertisement or otherwise that it will operate one or more air-
planes between any designated points regularly . ..upon which
airplane or airplanes it will accept for transportation, for compen-
sation or hire such members of the public as may apply therefore."'"
This definition was revised after World War II and registration re-
quirements were instituted.
In the meantime, an air transport industry developed composed
of these non-certificated carriers,"7 and in 1948 the CAB instituted
a large scale investigation of these irregular carriers and removed
the blanket exemption." Again, in 1951, a general investigation of
the services of large irregular carriers was commenced. In 1955 the
CAB authorized these "supplemental" air carriers to perform un-
limited charter operations on a planeload basis for passengers and
property in domestic flights, and for property only in international
flights."' The CAB noted that these carriers performed a useful and
man, Regularization of the Legal Statute of International Air Charter Service, 38
J. Am L. & CoM. 441, 456 (1972).
13 Lichtman, supra note 32, at 452.
34 Id.
3 49 U.S.C. §§ 1386(a), 1386(b) (1970).
"
4 See J. H. FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 182-84 (1961).
"See R. L. CAvES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 171-74 (1962).
"'Large Irregular Carriers, Exemptions, 11 C.A.B. 609 (1950). Irregular air
carriers were conducting services beyond those authorized and were advertising
to the public through travel agents. See FULDA, supra note 18, at 197.
11 Large Irregular Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 853, afl'd on reconsidera-
tion, 22 C.A.B. 838 (1955).
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necessary service in meeting demands for flights, services, and char-
ter operations which were not met by the scheduled carriers. These
air carriers were recognized as innovators in developing low-cost
air transportation. In 1962 Congress approved an amendment to
the Act recognizing "supplemental air carriers" and providing for
their certification."3
The Statement of International Air Transportation Policy sug-
gests that scheduled and supplemental carriers should be permitted
a "fair opportunity to compete" in the bulk transportation market.
The government should not allow "enjoyment of the right-to-per-
form both scheduled and charter service to result in decisive com-
petitive advantage for scheduled carriers."' The present definition
of "supplemental air transportation," including charter trips and
inclusive tour charter trips, however, contains the following pro-
vision:
Nothing in this paragraph shall permit a supplemental air carrier
to sell or offer for sale an inclusive tour in air transportation by
selling or offering for sale individual tickets directly to members
of the general public, or to do so indirectly by controlling, being
controlled by, or under common control with, a person authorized
by the Board to make such sales.'
Thus, supplemental airlines cannot compete directly for the busi-
ness of individual passengers. This requirement was originally im-
posed to maintain the distinction between the group charter service
performed by supplemental carriers from the individually ticketed
service performed by the scheduled carriers.' The supplemental
carriers must depend on intermediaries such as tour operators,
whereas scheduled carriers may sell their services directly to the
public through their own reservation agents." Several of the United
4049 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(3) (1970). It has recently been decided that this pro-
vision does not bar supplementals from scheduled authority. World Airways, Inc.
v. CAB, 547 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
41 Statement, supra note 32, at 7.
-349 U.S.C. S 1301(34) (1970).
"3See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 545 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1976);
Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 483 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" Note that problems in distinguishing between charter and scheduled services
still remain. The CAB has never clearly articulated the limits of charter service
and the Act contains no definition of a charter trip. See Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 545 F.2d 771, 774 (2d Cir. 1976): "Congress intended 'charter' to
be a flexible term which the CAB is free to define in accordance with experience
1977]
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States' scheduled carriers have established in-house charter tour
operations in direct competition with the supplemental carriers. '
III. A POSSIBLE DECISION ON THE MERITS
A. Air Carrier Control of United States-Originating Tour Opera-
tions Constitutes an Unfair Method of Competition Requiring
Regulation by the CAB.
The decision of a company to expand internally in order to
establish selling outlets or to enter other lines of business is purely
a business matter. Entry through internal expansion increases the
number of competitors in the market by one. Usually a company
enters a new market with a belief that it can perform the new
function at least as well as, if not better than, the firms already in
the market. It provides incentives to those in the market to con-
tinue efforts at cost-reduction and innovation." In addition, the
integrated firm has special incentives and abilities to utilize re-
sources for these purposes:
A company will have unusual incentives to develop . . . better
outlets or new uses for its product; it may have unusual opportuni-
ties, arising from its operating experience, to perceive the need and
possibilities for such an effort; and it might, by being able to assure
successful innovations a market, be best able to justify the applica-
tion of resources to their development."'
These types of incentives influenced Qantas' decision to enter
the tour business. Qantas wanted to eliminate from the price of such
tours the mark-up for expense and profit of the independent tour
wholesaler. This ultimate saving to the consumer was one of the
"principal factors" which caused Qantas to market its own tours."
These advantages, however, present offsetting dangers: if the
strength of one division is used to give another division an unfair
and changing circumstances as long as the integrity of scheduled service traffic
is not vitiated."
41 Several airlines do operate such tour operations-TWA's Getaway Plan;
Eastern's Fly/Cruise tours with Cunard.
1 2 F. KAHN, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 256-57, 260-61 (1970).
4 1Id. at 261.
4
'Initial Brief for Respondent at 21, Foremost v. Qantas, CAB Docket No.
27,631 (1976).
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competitive advantage, a case of unfair competition is presented."'
Unfair methods of competition are prohibited by section 411:
"The board may.. . investigate and determine whether any . . .
foreign air carrier ... has been or is engaged in any unfair or de-
ceptive practices or any unfair methods of competition in air trans-
portation or the sale thereof. . . ."" This section is concerned with
protection of the public interest. 1 Jurisdiction can be assumed in
this case because the definition of public interest in the Act in-
cludes, "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system ....
Many unfair methods of competition do not assume the propor-
tions of antitrust violations. One need not show that the practice
has totally eliminated competition in a particular market. A finding
that the practice unfairly burdens competition to a significant de-
gree is enough to condemn the practice." A violation can be found
if conduct runs counter to the public policy declared by the Act."
Proof of actual injury is not necessary."
When the practice in issue does resemble recognized antitrust
violations, the CAB may look to cases applying those laws for guid-
ance." The leading cases on vertical integration hold that the le-
gality of an integration depends on the power it creates." Use of
monoply power, no matter how lawfully acquired, to foreclose or
destroy competition or to gain a competitive advantage is illegal
under the antitrust laws,"' yet price-cutting, without more, is a com-
'9 FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927); United States v. National
Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
5049 U.S.C. S 1381 (1970).
51 American Airlines, Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956).
62 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1970).
5 3 FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223, 230 (1968). Since § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), and § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970), use similar language, these sections have been inter-
preted and applied consistently. American Airlines v. North Am. Airlines, 351
U.S. 78, 82 (1956).
"
4 Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965); American Airlines,
Inc. v. North Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 78, 83 (1956).
" Spiegel v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896
(1974).
"Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965).
"'United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334
U.S. 110 (1948).
"United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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petitive practice, not an antitrust violation. "
We will first consider economic effects and then discuss the pub-
lic policy concerns in order to determine whether the airline's ver-
tical integration into the tour business constitutes an unfair method
of competition.
1. The Economic Impact of Vertical Integration Is Anticompeti-
tive.
Qantas is the Australian national airline. It competes with four
other airlines in the United States-South Pacific market. Yet, Qan-
tas controls thirty percent of the weekly seat capacity allocated to
these carriers."0
The problems of vertical integration will be illustrated by the
testimony of various witnesses in the Qantas-Foremost dispute.
a. The "Deep Pocket"
Tour operations affiliated with airlines will have the benefit of
airline financial resources for the production and marketing of their
tours. Therefore, the number of tours which can be produced and
marketed will be increased, and the tour operations will have an
immediate market identity:"The 'affiliate' will, of course, trade on
its airlines' name. The consumers will then have the option of pur-
chasing a TWA Jet-A-Way Charter Tour or a '
charter tour. Which will he choose?"'"
In addition, the airline can include advertising for the tour within
its already established advertising program. Thus, the tour can get
exposure far beyond that which an independent tour operator could
afford. For the Qantas Holiday Tours, Qantas printed and dis-
tributed its own brochures, and its reservation offices were used to
provide tour information." In fact, Qantas provided the tour op-
erations without hiring any additional personnel.' In contrast, in-
" Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).0 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, affi-
davit of George Howling at 6, Foremost v. Qantas, 379 F. Supp. 88 (D. Hawaii
1974) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Law].
"1 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 1090.
2Bureau of Enforcement Brief at 16, Foremost v. Qantas, CAB Docket
No. 27,631 (1976) [hereinafter cited as B.O.E. Brief]. There was testimony before
the CAB that Qantas' reservation staff diverted to itself business meant for Fore-
most.
"Initial Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 28.
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dependent tour operators usually pay a portion of the cost of pro-
motional brochures and are responsible for trade advertising. The
sponsoring carrier may provide some national advertising."
b. Boycotting
The vertically integrated company often prefers to deal with its
own affiliate to the detriment of the independents. Likewise, buyers
of airspace often find it advantageous to deal with the integrated
carrier for purchase of inclusive tour packages as well.
Qantas established its own Qantas Holiday Tour operations in
the South Pacific in competition with Foremost. Qantas also jointly
marketed its tours with Canadian Pacific where their routes coin-
cided. Foremost was eliminated as a competitor for this tour busi-
ness.' Although Qantas continued to do business with other tour
operators," it did not do any significant amount of business with
Foremost. In addition, certain travel agents no longer did business
with Foremost after the Qantas take-over."7 It is possible that these
agents were afraid of losing Qantas services and commissions if
they did deal with Foremost. It should be noted that Foremost con-
tinues to operate its tours. British Airways and Air New Zealand
are its principal carriers;-" occasionally Foremost books space on
other carriers in the market, including Qantas.
c. Foreclosure
Scheduling imposes a great limit on charter operations due to
seasonal traffic. Vertical integration allows airlines to favor their
own tour operations to the exclusion of independents in allocating
the scarce peak-season capacity. There was evidence that this was
precisely what Qantas did. Qantas and other airlines allocate space
to proven producers on the basis of good business practice. When
marketing its tours with Qantas, Foremost was considered a "pro-
ven product"; it routinely received the space it requested for the
peak season. Upon termination of its relationship with Qantas,
4 Foremost International Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 379 F. Supp.
88, 92 (D. Hawaii 1974).
"Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 17, Foremost v. Qantas, 379 F. Supp. 88 (D. Hawaii 1974) [hereinafter cited
as Motion and Memorandum].
"Id. at 5.
SB.O.E. Brief, supra note 62, at 17-18.
66 Memorandum of Law, supra note 60, at 6.
1977]
82 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Foremost's request for space was put on a waiting list for the first
time in four years. Foremost was precluded, in part, because Qantas
reserved extra space for its in-house tour operations on at least
one of its own flights. This allotment was twenty percent more than
the total amount which Qantas reserved for all independent tour
operators on a single flight.' Without confirmed bookings, tours
become much harder to market. Travellers prefer direct, round-
trip flight arrangements on one carrier to a "hodge-podge" of flight
arrangements."0 As further illustration, the space reserved by Qan-
tas went unused by its tour department.
7 1
Affiliates can also be preferred in terms of scheduling, rates, and
cancellation policies. The affiliate can be offered the most desirable
flight times. Special low tariffs can be negotiated for charter tours
by affiliates, while higher aircraft rentals result from negotiations
with independents. Affiliates may be relieved from cancellation
charges, while independents have to pay the full penalty."
In addition, where airlines own hotels, similar preferences can
be given for hotel accomodation space, rates, and cancellations.
The airline also will gain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis its own
competitors which operate through independent tour producers'.
The airline affiliated with a tour operation will have a captive mar-
ket for its excess capacity and enjoy increased traffic over its routes.
d. Unfair Pricing Practices
Because the favored tour operator receives these concessions, it
will be able to market tours at lower prices. Further price reduc-
tions may be the result of pricing below costs or rebating. Vertical
integration increases the opportunity for such price concessions and
increases the possibility that they will go undetected. If the price
reductions are severe enough, competitors will be driven out of
business. Many fear the high prices will return without the competi-
tive spur of the independents. Specific pricing practices will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
11 B.O.E. Brief, supra note 62, at 17; Initial Brief for Complainant, supra
note 22, at 39.
"
0 Transcript, Foremost v. Qantas, CAB Docket No. 27,631 (1976).
7' B.O.E. Brief, supra note 62, at 18.




Usually an integrated firm "meets the test of the market" when it
finally sells its product to a consumer. Therefore, there is an in-
centive to integrate only when it is efficient to do so. However this
is not the case with regulated monopolies:
The higher costs incurred through a subsidiary's inefficiency, or
through outright padding of its records, may simply be passed on
to the consumer by the regulating authority. Therefore, unless the
operations of the subsidiary are fully subject to public inspection
and control, a strong prima facie case exists for separation, unless
there is satisfactory evidence of definite economies of integration. 3
In the Qantas case there is evidence that the integration permitted
Qantas to save money and to continue to participate in a tour pack-
age. By working alone, Qantas saved $750,000 a year which it had
previously been paying to Foremost for the tour services" and
avoided the commission paid to tour operators under IATA regu-
lations. Even so, there was much evidence presented which chal-
lenged the conclusion that integration enabled Qantas to produce
tours at less than the full cost to a nonintegrated firm.'
Generally, the problems of integration are even more severe in
a regulated area:
Even more drastic are the entry-limiting effects of integration back-
ward or forward over a regulatory boundary which separates a
sphere of legal monoply from the competitive area ... where the
relative power of the firm in the primary market is greater than that
of firms in the . . . buying market, integration leads to the spread
of market dominance into [it] .. ..
In such circumstances, integration is not related to economics, but
to the achievement, maintenance, spread, or exploitation of market
power. In short, diversification is the basis of a scheme to avoid
government control.
" Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REV. 27, 43-44
(1949).
'4 There is some question as to the legality of this payment.
, See Initial Brief for Complainant, supra note 22, at 14-24; B.O.E. Brief,
supra note 62, at 24-25.
" C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 121-22 (1959).
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2. Acquisitions of Control of Tour Operators by Domestic Airlines
Will Not Be Approved by the Board.
Section 408 of the Act prohibits U.S. air carriers and foreign
air carriers from acquiring control of any citizen of the United
States engaged in any phase of aeronautics without Board approv-
al." It also details the requirements for such approval.""
In Foreign Study League v. CAB,"9 the court ruled that airline
control of a tour operator will not be approved under section 408.
In that case, a conglomerate corporation, Transamerica Corp., ac-
quired Foreign Study League (FSL), a corporation organizing for-
eign study-travel courses, after having acquired Trans International
Airlines (TIA), one of the largest certificated supplemental air car-
riers. By doing so, Transamerica "brought under the roof of a single
corporation one of the nation's largest supplemental air carriers
and the nation's largest buyer of air transportation in the foreign
study-travel business. Such a potential tie-in definitely merited pos-
sible anticompetitive consequences . . . ." The court adopted the
"conflict of interest" test advocated by the CAB and determined
that the acquisition created anticompetitive conditions not in the
public interest.
The conflict of interest was discussed by the court. To maximize
TIA's benefit, FSL would provide a guaranteed base for its trans-
atlantic flights and might charge a higher price than that charged
by other carriers. If FSL was to benefit, lower rates and preferred
charter scheduling would be available to it.1 In either case, com-
petition would be harmed.
These same dangers exist where the control of tour operations
has been established by a carrier's internal expansion. The public
interest seems to be promoted by the existence of independent tour
operators whose sole interest is to create the best package for the
lowest price for his customers-the consumers of charter tours.
7749 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1970).
781d. § 1378(b) (1970).
79475 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1973), ag'g Reopened Transamerica Corp. and






3. Indirect Air Carrier Permits Will Not Be Unconditionally Ap-
proved Where Some Control Relationship Exists Between the
Air Carrier and the Tour Operator.
In Kuoni Travel Limited and Laker Air Travel Limited, " the
CAB denied blanket authorization for foreign tour operators to
organize charters originating in the United States which used the
services of an affiliated foreign air carrier. The CAB reaffirmed the
Foreign Study League (Transamerica) decision and restated the
policy considerations previously discussed:
The direct air carrier parties to the Laker proceeding urge that
there are significant economic advantages inherent in providing
charter operations through an "in house" or affiliated subsidiary
tour operator. Thus they urge that there exists an increased effi-
ciency of charter operations because of greater control over charter
booking, the avoidance of ferrying and positioning flying, crew
utilization, maintenance planning and other details, and the moni-
toring capability for early detection of potential cancellations.
However, it is precisely these economic advantages, which, when
coupled with the preferential and "synergistic" practices referred to
by the Board in the Transamerica case, would create a significant
competitive advantage for any direct air carrier that was affiliated
with a tour operator.'
In addition, the CAB addressed the statutory and regulatory lim-
itations upon the organization of charters through affiliated tour
operators.
[T]he definition of "Supplemental Air Transportation" in section
101(36) (49 U.S.C. 1301(36)) includes a proscription against
supplemental air carriers selling tours through an affiliated tour op-
erator. A similar policy is reflected in the Board's charter regula-
tions, where a tour operator and foreign tour operator are defined
as "... (other than a direct air carrier) . . . " and the exemptions
from section 408(a) and 409 applicable to control or interlocking
relationships (and the approval of interlocking relationships with
respect to foreign tour operators) are specifically made inapplic-
able to such relationships "with direct air carriers." "
The CAB recognized that any such authorization would place
United States carriers at a serious disadvantage. Such a result would
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be contrary to the International Air Transportation Fair Competi-
tive Practices Act.' This Act directs the CAB to "take all appro-
priate actions within its jurisdiction" to eliminate all "forms of dis-
crimination or unfair competitive practices to which United States
air carriers are subject in providing foreign air transportation serv-
ices .... ."" Recently, the courts have recognized the obligation of
the CAB to "re-examine [its] policies regularly to guarantee that
relevant changes in the international air transportation market are
taken into account and that the position of U.S. scheduled and sup-
plemental carriers in the international charter market is protected.""
The courts have concluded that it would not be in the public inter-
est to allow foreign tour operators to organize charters on behalf of
their affiliated carriers while United States direct air carriers are
precluded from doing so:
The fact that U.S. tour operators affiliated with U.S. direct air
carriers might be permitted to engage in organization of charters
originating in Switzerland or the United Kingdom, does not require,
under principles of reciprocity, the grant of authority to Swiss or
United Kingdom tour operators affiliated with direct air carriers
to organize charters originating in the United States, where U.S.
laws and policies would preclude such operations by U.S. citizen
tour operators."
The CAB recently limited the Kuoni decision. The American So-
ciety of Travel Agents (ASTA) and the United States Tour Op-
erators Association requested a rulemaking proceeding to prohibit
the direct marketing of tours carried on scheduled service by sched-
uled airlines." The CAB denied the petition stating that the public
interest would not be served by such a prohibition.
The CAB noted that vigorous competition exists with independ-
ent tour operators for these fares. The use of buying power to ar-
range and offer the lowest possible price is the main advantage to
group travel and provides the competitive tool used by tour oper-
ators and airlines alike.
-49 U.S.C. § 1159b (Supp. V 1975).
80/d.
81 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 517 F.2d 734, 746 (2d Cir. 1975).
8 Kuoni Travel Ltd., [1976] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,210. See also Martin's
Air Charter Co., [1964-1971 Transfer Binder] Av. L. REP. (CCH) 21,765.
" CAB Order No. 76-12-101 (Dec. 16, 1976).
[43:71
TOUR OPERATORS
This decision ignored the problems posed by airline integration.
Conflict of interest problems abound. And, as- we have seen, the
advantages to the scheduled carriers of joint advertising and direct
marketing represent associated disadvantages to the independent
tour operators." If only independent tour operators were competing
for this tour business, competition might be even more rigorous;
more operators would enter and bargain for these fares knowing
that none of their competitors had an unfair size or "name" ad-
vantage. The use of buying power would still lead to low prices for
the consumer.
The rationale behind the decision was that the CAB does not
consider group travel on scheduled flights to be charter transporta-
tion. In fact, the ASTA decision specifically limited Kuoni to affili-
ations in the charter field, thereby insuring that it was not pertinent
to the ASTA petition. Under the definition of charter transporta-
tion used in this article, which includes all group services, Kuoni
would apply to tour operators booking tours on scheduled flights,
and the ASTA decision would have little impact.
In ASTA, the CAB based its decision on a distinction between
scheduled and charter service. Ironically, by continuing to allow the
direct marketing of tour programs by scheduled carriers, the CAB
effectively blurred the distinction upon which it relied.
4. Effective Competition in the Foreign Markets Does Not Require
Airline/Tour Operator Affiliations.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, the court ap-
proved the decision by the CAB not to exercise its jurisdiction over
foreign tour operators, effectively permitting them to charter for-
eign air carriers for tours originating abroad. Moreover, this ab-
dication allowed foreign tour operators to be controlled by foreign
airlines without prior CAB approval."
In response, United States carriers argued that they should be
permitted such affiliations in foreign countries so they could com-
pete more effectively.
Even such control arrangements may not be sufficient to close
the competitive gap. Foreign tour operators have a competitive ad-
" See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
91392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
" 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 1095; see note 9 supra.
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vantage for various reasons: 1) Local airline affiliates of foreign
tour operators subsidize the ground packages; 2) Aircraft space
can be purchased on a year-round basis, lowering their costs for
flight space; and 3) Tour operators are favored by governmental
regulations and may be part of a governmentally-owned monop-
oly."
Once air carrier affiliations with tour operators are permitted in
foreign markets, it can be argued that the policies of the CAB which
prohibit such affiliations at home will be effectively frustrated:
[United States airlines] will gain all the ingredients for market
control inside this country. It is a fairly simple matter for the air-
lines' foreign tour operator subsidiary to enter into arrangements
with a so-called independent tour operator in the United States and
for the two to combine their mutual interests in traffic, preferen-
tial tariffs, and subsidized promotional and sales assistance. The
net result is the same as if the airlines are allowed to own or con-
trol U.S. tour operators.'
Based on the preceding analysis, the CAB should conclude that
integration in Foremost v. Qantas is an unfair method of competi-
tion. It frustrates the public interest in promoting competition to
the extent possible in both domestic and international aviation with-
out any off-setting public advantage: lower fares are not assured;
stronger United States carriers cannot be assumed; and more effi-
cient tour operations have not been evidenced.
The following discussion of pricing practices supports this con-
clusion.
B. Practices in Pricing Inclusive Charter Tours by Integrated Air-
lines Threatened Competition in the Tour Operating Business.
1. Low Fares for Inclusive Tours May Constitute Illegal Rebates.
Section 403 (b) of the Act provides:
No ... foreign air carrier ... shall charge or demand or collect
or receive a greater or less or different compensation for air trans-
portation, or for any service in connection therewith, than the ...
fares... specified in then currently effective tariffs... ; and no...
foreign air carrier ... shall, in any manner or by any device, direct-
ly or indirectly, or through any agent or broker, or otherwise, re-
1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 1108.
SId.
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fund or remit any portion of the ... fares ... so specified, or ex-
tend to any person any privileges or facilities, with respect to
matters required by the Board to be specified in such tariffs, except
those specified therein.""
The Act also provides criminal penalties for granting or receiving
rebates."
Where an air carrier is operating its own inclusive tours, this
problem in computing the cost of the air fare component of the in-
clusive tour package is presented. Should the fare include a factor
for overhead and administrative costs of the tour operation? If not,
are the tour passengers receiving, in effect, a rebate on the price of
their air fare? The problem is especially acute in the Qantas case
where Qantas claims it has experienced no additional costs in as-
suming the tour programming operations.
The general policy of the CAB includes "the promotion of ade-
quate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges, without unjust discrimination, undue preference or ad-
vantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices."' The
CAB has established a basic fare structure which includes both di-
rect and indirect operating costs allocated to various classes of serv-
ice." Inclusive tour fares, however, being promotional, or discount,
are not included in this structure. The CAB discussed the pricing of
these fares in its Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation (DPFI)
Phase 5-Discount Fares." The CAB recognized the value in elimi-
nating short term conditions of excess capacity by using promotion-
al fares to fill empty seats, but it also noted the potential danger in
generating traffic requiring additional capacity, which would be
detrimental to full-fare passengers in the long run.' The CAB held
-49 U.S.C. S 1373(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
-Id. 5§ 1373(b)(1), 1472(d).
971d. 5 1302(c) (1970).
"Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI), Phase 9 (Fare Structure),
[1974] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,137. Direct operating costs include flight crew
salaries, fuel and oil, insurance, maintenance and overhead, and depreciation.
" [1972] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,096.
1000ne court explained the problem in this way: A high volume of discount
fare passengers may cause the airlines to increase capacity. (Discount passengers
are not just using up extra seats.) The over-capacity will be paid for by the full-
fare passengers whose rates are based on a certain percentage load factor. The
burden of over-capacity is increased on full-fare passengers, because although the
CAB allows only 45% empty seats, it allows another 20% to be half-empty
19771
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that discount fares are economically justified only where they fill
seats which are empty due to present excess capacity. The CAB
used a "profit impact" test for costing these fares:
[A] discount fare may thus be profitable if it generates sufficient
additional traffic to more than offset (1) the diversion of the full-
fare traffic and (2) the added non-capacity costs associated with
the generated traffic, less any savings in cost attributable to the na-
ture of the services provided to the discount traffic. 0'
In the South Pacific inclusive tours market, there is no evidence
of diversion from full-fare passengers. "Qantas' principal full-fare
passenger is the business traveller, who is not interested in the hotel
limitations, time restrictions or other features of the inclusive
tour.' '. 2 However, promotional fares generate more traffic and fill
more seats than would be diverted from full-fare revenues."0 Gen-
erally, it is recognized that the various features of the inclusive
tours sufficiently distinguish it from individually-ticketed service' °
to attract passengers who otherwise would not travel.
The tour package is recognized as a transport-related service.
In pricing such services, those expenses which would remain as an
essential part of the air transport service if the transport-related
services were terminated should not be included.' °5 This pricing
scheme is consistent with the policy discussed above for pricing the
air fare, using the "added non-capacity costs."
Following these principles, Qantas considered only the addition-
al costs of the land components in pricing its tours.'0 The tariffs
Qantas filed included these costs, met the minimum price require-
ments of IATA and the CAB, ' and were followed by Qantas.
by being filled by those who do not pay full fare. See Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d
298 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
101 [1972] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,096 at 14,249 (emphasis added).
102 Initial Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 26.
103 Id.
'
04 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 545 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1976); Saturn
Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 483 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1973); American Airlines, Inc.
v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
105 14 C.F.R. § 10-7100 (1977).
'0' Initial Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 28.
107 Ironically, the CAB set the minimum price of inclusive tours for planeload
charters at 110% of the air fare price, so that scheduled airlines could not price
the tour operators out of business. Supplemental Air Service Proceeding, 45
C.A.B 231, 264 (1966).
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However, Qantas alleged that no additional staff or administrative
expenses were incurred in producing its tours. ' Since these expens-
es were already recovered in its basic far structure, Qantas did not
include any factor for administrative and overhead costs of tour
operation.109
These practices lead to the charge that the Qantas price structure
included an unlawful subsidy of the land costs, constituting an il-
legal rebate under section 403 (b). Since the air fare price was set
by a tariff which did not include all of the costs of the tour opera-
tions, certain tour passengers received an indirect rebate in the
form of a lower-priced tour package. Part of the air fare collected
from participants in the higher-priced tours and non-tour passen-
gers was applied to cover the overhead of the tour operation.'0
Air fare does cover certain tour-related operating costs such as
traffic servicing expenses, advertising, reservations, and ticket sales,
but expenses for negotiating land supplier contracts, printing pas-
senger baggage tags, and voucher checks are not included. 1' In ad-
dition, Qantas probably incurred at least minimal costs in starting
up the Qantas Holidays Tours and setting up a new department.
Foremost contends that Qantas' pricing practice conflicts with
the Air Carrier Reorganizaton Investigation."' In considering
whether air carriers should be able to diversify through the creation
of holding companies, the CAB alluded to the problems of recipro-
cal dealing between affiliated companies. In the rules promulgated
to guide air carriers in such diversifications, the CAB provided that
an air carrier should be reimbursed at least for the full cost of serv-
:08 Initial Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 28.
109 Another major problem presented in this case involved the appropriateness
of the exchange rate Qantas used in determining the cost of its tours. It was
agreed that Qantas was actually pricing below the total direct cost of the tour
portion by using an exchange rate which was lower than appropriate. The parties
were agreed on the crucial issue-that the price covered the cost of the land
components of the tour.
0 There are an enormous variety of possible rebate payments. See Hearings
on Oversight of CAB Practices and Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Ad-
ministrative Practices and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). The most common are rebates to high-volume travel agents in
exchange for their sending customers to the tour operator.
.. Brief for Complainant, supra note 22, at 22.
1 [1975] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,192. See also Comment, Air Carrier
Diversification, 40 J. Am L. & COM. 83 (1974).
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ices performed by that carrier for its affiliate and vice versa."' There
was no reimbursement between Qantas and Qantas Holidays for the
use of employees in performing each other's services." "
From an economic point of view, the CAB's pricing policies for
tours and discount fares are sound:
The costs of carrying 50 passengers on a scheduled plane flight
constitute a single lump of common costs. They are not incurred
on a passenger-by-passenger basis but all together or not at all....
The fact that most services are typically provided in combinations,
using the same facilities, does not mean that definable shares of
the common costs cannot in principle be causally attributed to
each ....
[A particular] service [such as tour fares or tour services]
bears a causal responsibility for a share of common costs only if
there is an economically realistic alternative use of the capacity
now used to provide it, or if production of [the service] requires
the building of additional capacity [use of another aircraft or a new
operating division]."'
The most recent enforcement proceeding in this area, Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc. v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., ° held that a fly-drive arrange-
ment between an air carrier and a car rental company constituted
an illegal rebating scheme. The administrative law judge found that
Budget Rent-A-Car was leasing cars to Aloha passengers at rates
less than their out-of-pocket costs; Aloha was reimbursing Budget
for the difference. The CAB sustained the finding of a violation of
the Act, but did not seem to rely on the fact that Budget's rates
were found to be below cost by the hearing judge:
Essentially, Aloha used a portion of the passenger fares it re-
ceived to make a large contribution to Budget's costs; that con-
tribution enabled Budget to offer low-cost rental cars to Aloha's
passengers; and those low-cost rentals were the means of rebating
to the passengers a portion of the fares they had initially paid.'"
Using this reasoning, Qantas' practices would be considered to be
illegal rebates. Several earlier cases are more favorable to Qantas.
113 [1975] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,192 at 14,707.
14 Brief for Complainant, supra note 22, at 24.
115 KAHN, supra note 46, at 77, 78.
114 [1976] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,222.01.
1 7 Id. at 14,860 (emphasis added).
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In Complaints v. American Shippers,0"' the CAB dismissed a com-
plaint challenging Shippers' practice of averaging the cost for
ground transportation of parcels as part of an air-ground service.
The CAB said that charges for incidental services such as a ground
transportation service do not have to be at cost if the rate charged
is reasonable, tested by some other standard, such as the value of
the services performed.1' However, American Shippers can be dis-
tinguished: since Qantas never estimated the overhead or adminis-
trative cost or the number of tour passengers before pricing the
tour, the rate may not be considered reasonable. In American Ship-
pers, the CAB spoke of covering total ground transportation costs,
in contrast to the more recent pricing policies which emphasize add-
ed costs. Moreover, the recent interest of the CAB in preventing re-
bating practices may limit the usefulness of American Shippers.
Even when the CAB refused to challenge the practice of paying
the passenger's ground transportation between airports, it gave a
warning which anticipated its more recent policy "Compliance
with a tariff will not excuse a rebate in the form of a service which
is not connected with transportation nor given immunity to acts vi-
olating the law against favoritism or discrimination.' '...
Qantas should be permitted to price at the additional costs to it
of producing the tour package-and not the full cost of service;
however, such prices must include the costs attributable to the tour
operations. Such costs can be measured. Although Qantas hired no
new personnel, some of its former airlines staff are now working for
the tour division. Similarly, office space, telephone service, and sec-
retarial staff have switched responsibilities. Why should the sched-
tiled passengers continue to bear these expenses for which the full-
fare passengers are no longer responsible? Why should passengers
on higher-priced tours pay a larger percentage of these expenses
when passengers on lower-priced tours are equally responsible for
these expenses? Such costs were never estimated by Qantas in pric-
ing its tours, but when the district court ordered Qantas to submit
such a cost figure, the costs were found to exceed $200,000.
I's30 C.A.B. 1478 (1960).
119Id. at 1486.
12°Ground Transportation Between Airports, 31 C.A.B. 5 (1960). See also
Seaboard World Airways, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 43 C.A.B. 751
(1965), which implied that if free or low-cost services were offered only as part
of a tie-in with the carrier's services, a violation of 5 403(b) would be found.
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Passengers on low-cost tours should not be permitted this benefit.
Costs should be reallocated, and perhaps the full-fare passengers
will be able to enjoy a lower airplane fare.
2. Passengers on Airline Inclusive Tours May Receive the Benefits
of Unjust Discrimination.
Section 404(b) of the Act provides:
No ... foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person
...or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect
whatsoever or subject any particular person .. .or description of
traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any un-
due or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect what-
soever.'
When Congress established this provision, it intended to underscore
the duty of an air carrier to provide service to all who request it
on equally favorable terms."' In deciding this matter, the CAB con-
siders cost factors and the public policies set forth in section 102,"3
including the encouragement and development of air transportation
and the promotion of adequate, economical service at reasonable
rates.
Foremost argues that Qantas' pricing policies result in unequal
treatment of air passengers who fly the same route under the same
conditions; only those who fly on Qantas Holidays receive the ben-
efit of the rebate in the air fare. As seen in the previous discussion,
however, this rebate is much smaller than Foremost contends."'
The controversy also is limited to the pricing of only a few of Qan-
tas' tour packages at the economy end of the total range of tour
packages Qantas had available.
Discrimination can be established by charging different rates to
different passengers afforded the same service or by offering special
services only to a select group.1 ' The passengers on all of Qantas'
12149 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
122 Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
12349 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). See Hawaiian Airlines Senior Citizens Stand-
by Fares, [1976] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,218.
124The rebate involves the difference between cost of land components and
some direct overhead costs. Qantas Holiday Tours do not have to be priced at
fully allocated costs.
122Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969).
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tours were travelling under the same conditions and should have
been charged the same price. A variety of factors must be evaluated
when deciding whether the price for Qantas' inclusive tours was
unduly discriminatory. Such factors include custom, price competi-
tion, promotional aspects, and promotion of efficiency."' Qantas
tried to establish an IATA minimum tour price as a price leader to
be competitive. This practice had been followed in the past when
the tours were jointly produced and marketed with Foremost.'7
Qantas was an additional competitor in an already competitive mar-
ket and was trying to establish customers for its new product. The
benefits to full-fare passengers of selling discount tickets have al-
ready been discussed. ' The benefits to the public of having an ad-
ditional competitor in the tour market are obvious. Furthermore,
the tours in issue were equally available to anyone interested in the
package tour idea. Under such circumstances, even though the dif-
ferences in cost were not fully reflected in the tour prices of Qantas'
early tours, the CAB could reasonably conclude that these differ-
ences were not unjust.
Foremost suggested that discrimination also existed between the
tour participants in these low-cost tours and the full-fare passen-
gers. It has been firmly decided, however, that tour participants and
full-fare passengers do not travel under the same conditions and do
not receive the same service.'2 ' In 1967, the CAB ruled that the
tie-in features of the group-inclusive tour fares with the purchase of
ground accommodations does not seem to be an unreasonable one
in view of the considerable discount these tours provide from nor-
mal and other fares.1 ' Thus, the CAB no longer concerns itself with
the alleged discriminatory aspects of the tour-based features. Espe-
cially in light of the market factors outlined above,"' the CAB
would not consider this case to be one involving discrimination.
The problem of discrimination, however, is a real one. Several
126 Id.
"' Initial Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 20.
'
28 See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra.
2"See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 517 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1975);
Group Inclusive Tour Basing Fares to Hawaii, [1970] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5
16,223.5805.
" CAB Order No. E-24,823 (March 6, 1967), cited in National Air Carriers
Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"' National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 442 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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explanations have been offered why a company would charge prices
below its total costs. These include: 1) a preference for greater
growth of the company; 2) an excess of competitive zeal-preda-
tory or otherwise; and 3) an opportunity for them to more fully
exploit their monopoly power."' The impact on competition, re-
gardless of the company's motives, must be considered. Several sug-
gestions have been made for tempering such pricing policies in the
presence of competition."
First, a lower limit could be placed on the tour package price to
prohibit the possibility that price reductions are predatory or de-
structive. The existing dollar limit on IATA minimum tour agree-
ments is too low. The CAB tour regulations effectively deal with
the problem by stating this limit as a percentage of the scheduled
air fare.'
Second, selective price-cutting may be controlled by permitting
regulated companies to reduce prices, subject to the condition that
they may not raise them unless they can show a cost change in the
interim. Thus, companies like Qantas could include a "price leader"
when entering a new market, but must be prepared to continue to
make the tour available to the public once it establishes its place in
the market.
Third, although it may be efficient in the static sense to permit a
regulated company to take business away from its rivals by reducing
rates on competitive services, there may be a dynamic loss if the re-
sult is elimination of competitors. A company like Foremost may
sufficiently contribute to innovation and improvement in service to
outweigh the static welfare loss in keeping it alive.
These pricing practices, abuses in themselves, further reinforce
the conclusion that vertical integration over a regulatory boundary
should be considered an unfair competitive practice. By narrowing
the margin between the price of the air fare it supplies to its one-
stage rivals and the price at which it sells its competing tour pack-
age, an integrated airline can limit the profit and growth of its tour
operator-rivals, or even drive them out of business entirely.""
1"2 KAHN, supra note 46, at 146.
11 Id. at 176-77.
""See 14 C.F.R. § 378.2(b)(4) (1977).
1,, KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 76, at 122.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES FOR REMEDIAL RELIEF
There are four figures in the scheme of airline regulations which
may limit, to varying degrees, practices such as vertical integration
which are contrary to the public interest. Which instrumentality
will best be able to control the abuses of vertical integration: the
CAB, the courts, the President, or the Congress?
A. The CAB
Following the analyses in the preceding section, the CAB should
conclude that integration in this case is an unfair method of com-
petition. The CAB should issue an order compelling Qantas to
cease and desist from using its in-house tour operator in packaging
and promoting tours originating in the United States." Moreover,
the CAB should re-open the ASTA petition .'. and grant its request
for rule-making to prohibit the direct marketing by scheduled car-
riers of tours originating in the United States which are carried on
scheduled service, thereby furthering the established policy in the
air carrier permit cases." It should also re-open its consideration of
IATA Resolutions 81 OD and 81 OE and disapprove the parts there-
of which authorize air carrier-tour operator affiliations on flights
originating in the United States. Through rule-making, the CAB
could prohibit all such affiliations and, in effect, attach this limita-
tion to all new and outstanding air carrier certificates.'"
This course of events is unlikely. The Bureau of Enforcement has
already dismissed the integration issue from the case, saying that
Qantas had a right to enter the tour operating business. This right
is based, in part, on IATA Resolutions 810D and 810E, which au-
thorize such affiliations and which were approved by the CAB.
Under section 412 of the Act, the CAB must issue an order
either approving or disapproving every intercarrier agreement filed
with the CAB upon a finding that the agreement is either in or ad-
1-649 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
1" Petitions for reconsideration, 14 C.F.R. § 302.37 (1977).
"8Petitions for rule-making, 14 C.F.R. S 302.38 (1977).
'9Rule-making procedures comply with the adjudicatory procedure required
under the Act for amendment of air carrier licenses under 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(g),
1372(f) (1970). American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 543 (1966); Foreign Permit Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 837
(1961), aff'd, BOAC v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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verse to the public interest or in violation of the Act.' ° Section 414
of the Act grants antitrust immunity for actions "authorized, ap-
proved or required by such [Board] order.....
In considering whether an agreement is in the public interest, the
CAB must consider the agreement's effect on competition. Compe-
tition, however, is merely one of six factors to be considered in
making this determination' " and could be outweighed by one or
more of the other factors. " In reviewing IATA agreements, the
CAB often, if not always, subordinates the competitive factor to
other interests.
One recent example is the re-approval by the CAB of an IATA
rate agreement relating to North Atlantic passenger fares.'" In 1972
these rates were approved, with reluctance, by the CAB, on a one-
year basis as a compromise solution to a rate disagreement. In 1973
these uneconomical rates were approved again. The CAB said ap-
proval was in the public interest-it promoted the convenience of
the traveling public. Yet this time extension would not necessarily
14049 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382(b) (1970).
141 Id. S 1384.
"Id. 51302:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this
chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the high-
est degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and co-
ordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive com-
petitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.
"'United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'"[1973] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,127, rev'd, Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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lead to an acceptable fare structure. The CAB ignored other viable
options, such as suspension of rates and bilateral rate agreements,
which would have promoted public convenience.
In 1967 a group of travel agents challenged the staff action ap-
proving IATA Resolutions 810D and 810E, which permitted
IATA carriers to initiate inclusive tours. The travel agents argued
that approval would result in "unfair competition for the travel
agency industry, the unnecessary expenditure of funds by carriers,
which could better be passed on to the public in the form of lower
fares, and an assumption by airlines of responsibilities [for ground
services] beyond the purpose for which they were certified." The
CAB nevertheless approved the resolutions, referring only to its
responsibility to promote air transportation. 5
A host of similar examples can be found.'" This situation led one
commentator to conclude:
All told, the decisions [of the Board] . . . attempt to prod IATA
to modify its procedures here and there, to admonish it occasional-
ly, but on the whole to accept, albeit reluctantly, the results of its
activities which the Board correctly described as "an all-embracing
international cartel." 147
Rationalizations for this policy include fear of rate wars, political
repercussions in the countries where American carriers are operat-
ing, and protection of IATA sales agency business, which repre-
sents a major source of international air travel."
B. The Courts
Any order of the CAB, except those orders which require Pres-
idential approval, is subject to court review.1 ' In this review, find-
141 IATA Inclusive Tours, 46 C.A.B. 838 (1967).
4 Among them are: North Atlantic Tourist Commission Case, 16 C.A.B. 225
(1952), (approving an IATA resolution establishing a 6% commission on sales
of tourist class service in contrast to a 7.5% commission on sales of first class
service); Agreement Adopted by IATA Relating to Group Fares, 36 C.A.B. 33
(1962), (approving a 38% discount on transatlantic scheduled flights, arguably
calculated to eliminate supplemental airlines from the market); National Air
Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and 442 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), (approving an IATA fare package without substantial evidence).
'
47 FULDA, supra note 18, at 251.
148 Id. at 250-5 1.
1 49 U.S.C. S 1486 (1970). Congress did not provide for judicial review of
presidentially-approved orders for foreign air carrier permits because approval of
such applications has overtones of foreign affairs. See Sitmar Cruises, Inc. v.
CAB, 14 Av. Cas. 17,177 (D.D.C. 1976).
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ings of fact made by the CAB and supported by substantial evi-
dence are conclusive.' Court review is not to support the balancing
of interests by the CAB, but to insure that the CAB gives reasons
for its conclusions."'
If the CAB had condemned the practice of vertical integration
and issued a cease and desist order under section 411, the court
would have affirmed the order, so long as the order included a rea-
sonable justification for the action by the CAB. However, in the
Qantas case, the Bureau of Enforcement found that Qantas had a
right to enter the tour operating business, based in part on IATA
Resolutions 81 OD and 81 OE, which had been approved by a CAB
order pursuant to section 412 of the Act. What power do the courts
have in reviewing such CAB orders, which have anticompetitive
consequences?
The CAB, in the Local Cartage Agreement Case,"' adopted a
standard for determining whether approval under section 412 of
an agreement having anticompetitive aspects is consonant with the
public interest: "Where an agreement has among its, significant as-
pects elements which are plainly repugnant to established antitrust
principles, approval should not be granted unless there is a clear
showing that the agreement is required by a serious transportation
need, or in order to secure important public benefits.''
'
In National Air Carrier Association v. CAB, the court used a
different standard, stating that the test of whether fares adopted by
the conference of scheduled carriers conform to antitrust principles
is not whether there is an "intent to aggrandize the share of the
scheduled carriers in a market also served by the supplementals,"
but whether the "particular means devised for effectuation [of such
intent] unduly jeopardize [the] market structure conducive to
maximum feasible competition.""' Under this standard, the court
affirmed CAB approval of an IATA fare package which subjected
the supplemental carriers to intensive competition, because the
0 Nebraska Dep't of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962);
Specht v. CAB, 254 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1958).
" Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"' Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850 (1952).
"Id. at 863.
-4442 F.2d 862, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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CAB found that the competition was not destructive.1 Unfortun-
ately, the court's suspicions that these lower fares were merely a
step toward an ultimate increase in concentration were never re-
lieved."'
This standard is inadequate to test whether carrier agreements
conform to antitrust principles. Although such agreements may not
"unduly" affect the structure of the market, they may result in anti-
competitive conduct by the carriers in the industry; they may also
solidify the positions of existing carriers in the market and result in
a lower level of performance by the industry as a whole.
Capacity-restricting agreements do not affect industry structure,
but have severe anticompetitive effects. The CAB recently allowed
just such an agreement between three major air carriers as to the
number and scheduling of flights in twenty major markets because
of a critical fuel shortage in 1973, and the CAB permitted its ex-
tension into 1974. Such agreements reduce the principal form of
competition in the industry and result in a lower level of service.
Unused capacity is artificially reduced by such arrangements, while
the high prices and over-investment continue. Carriers may use
idled equipment in other markets and distort allocation there, too."'
The court properly adopted the Local Cartage standard in setting
aside the CAB's action in United States v. CAB."' The court, how-
ever, suggested that had there been a subsequent procedure for
hearing or experimentation in certain markets to support the
CAB's decision that the competitive market response was wasteful
of energy, the court possibly would have affirmed the Board's order.
Thus, even under the Local Cartage standard, the scope of court
review is quite narrow. Even the most anticompetitive order might
receive affirmance on court "review."
Once an order is approved, it confers antitrust immunity suffi-
cient to enable a person to do anything authorized, approved, or
required by the order. In the leading case of Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court suggested that the
CAB is required to carefully scrutinize the particular acts before
1-1-442 F.2d at 874.
"
MNational Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"'Snow, Aviation Regulation, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 637, 656 (1975).
-8 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
19 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
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they can be authorized by a CAB order. The Court emphasized
that, "every acquisition or lease of aircraft by TWA from Toolco
required Board approval. Each transaction was approved by the
Board and each approval was an order.. . ."'" This reasoning was
followed by both the district court and the court of appeals in the
Qantas case. The court of appeals added:
The scope of the antitrust immunity which an agency's approval
can confer under statutes such as 49 U.S.C. §1384 was intended to
be, and is, no broader than the industry regulated. Butler Aviation
Co. v. CAB, 389 F.2d 517, 521 (2d Cir. 1968). A regulatory
agency's approval of certain actions cannot confer antitrust im-
munity to those actions unless the primary anticompetitive effect
those actions may have is limited to the industry in question.1
Yet, recent decisions by various courts have limited the Hughes
Tool decision.
In Grueninger International Travel, Inc. v. Air Transport Asso-
ciation of America,"' the court granted immunity for actions pur-
suant to a plan approved by the CAB when the CAB had merely
reviewed some annual reports and required some modifications of
the working resolution. In Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc.,"83 the court
held that CAB approval of the formation of a subsidiary to contract
with truckers included approval of the subsidiary's authority to
enter into such contracts and granted antitrust immunity for actions
implementing its operations, including contracts for competitive
service. The court said that individualized approval was not neces-
sary so long as the alleged conduct was clearly within the contem-
plation of prior CAB orders. It was sufficient that the alleged con-
duct was "the kind of conduct the CAB . . . [has] approved and
authorized for the future. 1.. Only where the parties go beyond the
terms of the proposal would their actions lose the immunity con-
ferred by CAB approval."'
This broad immunity is consistent with legislative history which
100409 U.S. at 379.
181 525 F.2d at 286.
282 405 F. Supp. 1241 (D.D.C. 1976).
163 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976).
184 Id. at 1131 (quoting Hughes Tool, 409 U.S. at 388-89).
1 Compare Air Freight Haulage of P.R., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 14
Av. Cas. 17,145 (D.P.R. 1976) with Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc.,
470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972).
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suggests that the CAB was to have broad jurisdiction over air carri-
ers insofar as most facets of federal control are concerned. 6' How-
ever, this broad reign is not consistent with the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co."7 Where the program
being challenged was the product of a decision in which both the
private utility company and the utility commission participated, the
court found nothing unjust in concluding that:
[The company's] participation in the decision is sufficiently signifi-
cant to require that its conduct implementing the decision, like
comparable conduct by unregulated businesses, conform to applic-
able federal law.
... There is no logical inconsistency between requiring such a
firm to meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural
monopoly powers and also to comply with antitrust standards to
the extent it engages in business activity in competitive areas of
the economy.168
Thus, the statutory language leaves the CAB free to overrule
antitrust provisions and confer immunity in "appropriate" cases,
while it leaves the courts without power to effectively review such
actions. The courts could not control a decision by the CAB to al-
low vertical integration even though it were thinly disguised as an
IATA agreement perfunctorily approved by CAB order.
C. The President
The CAB may solve the problem of vertical integration by pro-
mulgating rules and regulations generally prohibiting the direct
marketing of inclusive tours originating in the United States by air-
lines with affiliated tour operators and by prohibiting tour operators
from organizing such tours using the services of an affiliated air
carrier. Such a regulation would constitute a limitation on all for-
eign air carrier permits analogous to the conditions contained in the
air carrier permit issued to Kuoni.
As an aspect of its power to issue air carrier permits, the CAB
can attach "reasonable terms, conditions or limitations, as in its
'"Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304-05
(1963).
167428 U.S. 579, 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
"6'428 U.S. at 594, 596, 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
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judgment, the public interest may require."'" However, the terms
and conditions contained in any foreign air carrier permit and the
provisions of any regulations pertaining to foreign air routes are
subject to the approval of the President of the United States."
Under the statute, the CAB acts as a presidential advisor in this
area of foreign affairs, and its orders have no independent author-
ity. Because of presidential review, there can be no judicial re-
view.17
1
Similar provisions have received presidential approval in the
past. They are included in the CAB regulations pertaining to in-
clusive tour charters,"" as well as in several foreign air carrier per-
mits."r If President Carter is presented with such a CAB order, one
limiting foreign air carriers in the marketing of tours, he should fol-
low the lead of his predecessors and approve it.
Approval of such a hypothetical order would remedy the prob-
lems of vertical integration. Yet, in light of the recent denial of the
ASTA petition, one must recognize that the possibility that the
CAB will issue such an order is very remote indeed.
D. The Congress
Many of the problems discussed in the preceding sections could
be viewed as unavoidable consequences of a system of airline regu-
lation. With regulation comes protectionism to some extent, as well
as conflicts among the regulators and the regulated as to what truly
represents the public interest.
Recently, President Carter urged the Congress to reduce federal
control over the airline industry.' President Carter did not submit
his own legislation; however, four bills were introduced during the
Ninety-fourth Congress which deal with problems in airline regula-
tion and propose various solutions: Senate Bill 2551, the Ford ad-
1o49 U.S.C. 5§ 1371, 1372 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
170Id. § 1461.
171 C & S Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
The only case the courts will hear is one challenging the statutory authority of
the CAB to issue the order. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). See Calkins, The Role of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the Grant
of Operating Rights in Foreign Air Carriage, 22 J. AIR L. & CoM. 253 (1955)
and Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 725 (1973).
172 14 C.F.R. § 378.2(6) (1977).
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ministration bill;"' Senate Bill 3364, the Kennedy bill;'" Senate Bill
3536, the CAB proposal;" and Senate Bill 3830, Senator Cannon's
bill.
1 78
Generally, the Ford administration bill and the Kennedy bill sug-
gest sweeping changes in the scope of airline regulation, including
pricing flexibility and the liberalized entry requirements. The Ken-
nedy bill plans for total deregulation within ten years of its passage.
The CAB and Cannon bills are much less radical in approach, but
do respond to many of the problems facing airline regulation today.
The provisions of these bills which affect our present considera-
tions will be summarized in the following sections and their impact
will be evaluated.
1. Definitions
In the Ford administration bill"' and the Kennedy bill,'" inclu-
sive tour charter trips are specifically defined (subject to CAB reg-
ulations) and included within the definition of "supplemental air
transportation." The CAB proposal and Senator Cannon's bill sim-
ilarly define "charter air transportation" to include inclusive tour
charters. These two bills also specifically define "charter trip,""' but
the proposed definitions include only planeload charter flights.
Thus, under these two proposals inclusive tours on scheduled flights
would continue to be viewed as scheduled, not charter, service.
Such provisions effectively eliminate the administrative and judicial
uncertainty in this area, but replace uncertainty with an arbitrary-
1" Kuoni Travel Ltd., [1976] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,210 (order approved
by the President, June 17, 1976); Martin's Air Charter Co., [1964-1971 Transfer
Binder] Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 21,765 (order approved by the President, Dec. 18,
1967).
174 Philadelphia Inquirer, March 5, 1977, at 8-A, col. 1.
I5S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
"'IS. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
117S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
171S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). In addition, the Air Service Im-
provement Act of 1976, H.R. 14,604, was introduced by Representative Anderson
during the second session of the 94th Congress, 1976. That bill encouraged great-
er competition through liberalized entry requirements. Since its provisions do not
materially affect the problems here in issue, that bill will not be included in this
analysis.
7'S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(b), 3(c) (1975).
'"S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102(b), 102(d) (1976).
" S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. S 2(2) (1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 4(c) (1976).
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not a functional-distinction between scheduled and supplemental
service. In addition, the CAB bill specifically excludes charter trips
from its discrimination provision;' this change codifies case law
in the area.
On the positive side, all of these proposals firmly establish, at
long last, the propriety of charter trips in the scheme of airline
transportation. These bills further amend the definition of supple-
mental air transportation. All but the Ford administration plan per-
mit the direct sale of charter trips by eliminating the old provision
which prohibits the supplemental carriers from selling or offering
individual tickets directly to the general public.1 ' A proposal similar
to these was made in 1973.'" It was suggested that the direct mar-
keting of inclusive tour charters would eliminate some of the prob-
lems of independent tour operators discussed earlier.'" More money
could be spent on advertising if the carrier, as well as the tour op-
erator, could promote tours; this would help offset the advantage of
"in house" tour operations. Increased advertising would mean in-
creased demand for tours, further enhancing the position of inde-
pendents in the market. Support from the airlines would also help
spread the risk associated with tour promotion and could lead to
more innovative tour operations.'" There would be no problem with
diversion of traffic from the scheduled flights, since charter opera-
tions are recognized as a service distinct from scheduled service,
even if marketed directly." '
The Ford administration proposal approached this result indi-
rectly by permitting a supplemental carrier to control or be under
the control of a person authorized to sell individual tickets directly
to members of the public, if such control is approved by the CAB.18'
The Ford proposal also creates several problems; for example, in its
attempt to foster indirect sales of charter trips, it jeopardizes the
existence of the independent tour operator. The proposal allows the
United States supplemental airlines to have the same relationship
18'S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 7(c) (1976).
83S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 102(d) (1976); S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2(2) (1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(c) (1976).
"8 Hearings on S. 455 and S. 1739 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Senate Commerce Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
"'See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
'.. Hearings on S. 455 and S. 1739, supra note 184, at 168.
1 7 Id. at 103.
" 'S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1975).
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with tour operators that Qantas, a foreign carrier, now enjoys. Per-
haps this provision was drafted in response to claims of competitive
necessity. American flag carriers have applied for authority to con-
trol European tour operators and to market European-originating
tours to the United States;".' they have also requested such authority
for charters originating in the United States.'"
This same provision of the Ford bill would also put supplemental
carriers in the same position as scheduled carriers, enabling them
to apply for similar authority. However, it would contradict the
policy of the CAB, as evidenced by Kuoni, of limiting such control
relationships. Passage of the bill might be construed as a signal to
the CAB to revise or even reverse its policy in this area, but United
States air carriers might still not be on an "equal footing" with for-
eign carriers, for the reasons previously discussed."'
At least one supplemental air carrier recommends against such
vertical integration; claiming that it does not want to assume the
risk on the load factor, it cited the high degree of consolidation in
the United Kingdom as a significant contributing factor in some
major tour operator/air carrier collapse there.'" Finally, it suggest-
ed that the resulting increase in vertical integration would severely
diminish competition in the tour industry.'" As CAB Chairman
Robson explained, the probable result would be that "all but the
largest independent tour operators would be gradually squeezed out
of the market . .. ."'9'
2. Tariffs and Pricing
All of the bills include new rate provisions'. which eliminate
' Application of Pan Am (CAB Docket No. 28,515); Application of Over-
seas National Airway (CAB Docket No. 28,668); Application of TIA (CAB
Docket No. 28,604); Application of World Airways (CAB Docket No. 28,668).
10 Application of World Airways (CAB Docket No. 28,030); Application
of TIA (CAB Docket No. 29,060); Application of Overseas National Airway
(CAB Docket No. 29,283).
See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
'"1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 576.
193 Id.
... Id. at 344. Note that the CAB requested that it be permitted to retain its
authority to continue its present policies. Summary Analysis of S. 2551 by the
CAB, 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 425.
"93S. 2551, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 14 (1975); S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 6, 14 (1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1976); S. 3364, 94th Cong.,
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many of the problems facing a domestic air line in defending a re-
bating charge under circumstances like those in Qantas. For exam-
ple, the Ford bill proposes that a rate "above 'direct costs,'... may
not be found to be unjust or unreasonable on the basis it is too
low."'" Direct costs would not include items such as general and
administrative expenses or "costs associated with the development
of a new route or service.. '... In evaluating individual rates and
determining and prescribing a lawful rate under the Ford bill, the
CAB must consider, among other things, the need for low cost serv;-
ice, the need for price competition and the desirability of a variety
of price and service options, and the quality or type of service re-
quired in each particular market.'
As to foreign air transportation, however, all of the bills leave
the CAB with the limited power it now has to review tariffs and
either accept or reject them. It has been argued that the CAB
should not be given rate-setting authority since other countries do
not have it. Veto power is as strong a unilateral step as can be taken,
considering that there is not at present any substitute for the con-
ference procedure."' The present standard at least includes special
consideration of whether rates are predatory or tend to monopolize
competition among air carriers and foreign air carriers in foreign
air transportation.''
There are other objections to the existing tariff mechanism. A
firm is required by its tariff to announce in advance the amount of
any proposed price reduction. This insures that rivals will have time
to respond in kind. Therefore, since it will not be able to gain more
customers by doing so, a firm will not be likely to reduce its, prices.
In addition, the risk in raising prices is reduced, since advance no-
tice ensures that the firm can "gauge the response of its rivals be-
fore the increases actually go into effect.""' Thus, the oligopolistic
pricing policies in the foreign market remain unaffected by the new
2d Sess. § 456 (1976).
1"S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(a) (1975).
91 Id. § 14(e).
"'I d. § 14(b); Note that the Kennedy bill provides for prescribing maximum
rates only. S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 456 (1976).
'M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 212 (1969).
2-49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1970).
"' Levine, Alternative to Regulation: Competition in Air Transportation and
the Aviation Act of 1975, 41 J. Am. L. & COM. 703, 716-17 (1975).
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legislative proposals.
3. Standards for Approval of Control Relationships and Other
Inter-Carrier Agreements
All the new proposals strengthen the standards against which a
control arrangement under section 408 must be measured."0' The
Kennedy and Ford bills propose standards similar to that in the
Clayton Act to guide CAB approval.' The Kennedy standard is
only temporary, looking ultimately to review of these arrangements
under the antitrust laws.' All but the CAB plan require that notice
be sent to the Attorney General and provide that an appropriate
suit may be brought to challenge the control arrangement. In fact,
the Cannon plan merely requires filing of the arrangement and re-
lies on the Attorney General to challenge any agreements under the
appropriate antitrust statute.2"'
By contrast, each of the bills proposes a different standard which
must be met before inter-carrier agreements can be approved under
section 412. The Ford bill provides, in part, that approval shall not
be given for agreements in overseas transportation which 1) control
levels of capacity, 2) relate to apportioning earnings, or 3) fix
fares.' With respect to all other agreements in foreign air transpor-
tation, it adopts the present standard of "not adverse to the public
interest.""7 The new policy statement included in this bill empha-
sizes increased competition; accordingly, the anti-competitive ef-
fects of foreign air carrier agreements will be more thoroughly con-
sidered before such agreements are approved by the CAB."' Pro-
visions for notice to the Attorney General and Secretary of Trans-
portation and hearing on merits of the agreement are included in
202S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 11 (1975); S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
492 (1976); S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 12 (1976).
201S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. S 11(b) (1975); S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 492(c) (1976).
204S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 492(a) (1976).
201S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a) (1976).
2 0 S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1975).
207 Id. But see S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1975) for a new definition
of public policy.
208 Id. § 12. For agreements involving domestic airlines only, clear and con-
vincing evidence must exist that the agreement is necessary to meet a serious
transportation need or to secure important public benefits and that no less anti-
competitive alternative is available to reach the same result. Id.
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the bill.
The Kennedy proposal provides merely for the filing of inter-
carrier agreements between an air carrier and a foreign air carrier
or other carrier,' leaving antitrust enforcement to the Justice De-
partment. In the regulations for the transition period, it provides
for disapproval of all agreements on fixing rates, charges, or divid-
ing markets, as well as agreements contrary to the public interest or
contrary to, or in violation of, the Act. It also requires disapproval
of all agreements that "restrain trade or may lessen competition
substantially unless the anti-competitive effects of the contract or
agreement are clearly out-weighed in the public interest by signifi-
cant transportation needs that cannot be substantially satisfied in
any less restrictive way."
This standard adopts a liberalized Clayton Act approach. It has
been criticized because it corrects past problems in the administra-
tion of the Act while it leaves the CAB with the power to "recreate
an anti-competitive regime through specific decisions. ' '.. Under the
Kennedy plan, however, this section will terminate ten years after
enactment of the bill and represents a workable approach for the
transition to the stricter antitrust standards.
Neither the CAB plan nor the Cannon bill have proposals deal-
ing with these problems. The CAB requested that it be permitted to
retain its authority to continue its present policies, ' and the Can-
non bill retains the existing standard for agreements in foreign
transportation."'
These proposals unanimously call for stricter standards when
dealing with agreements and control relationships among parties in
the air transportation field. They heed the warnings raised earlier
concerning integration in a field where competition is already tem-
pered by the presence of regulation. Yet, two of these bills do not
deal at all with the problems, of inter-carrier agreements in foreign
9 S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 455 (1976). This includes IATA agree-
ments.
210 Id. § 493 (emphasis added).
211 Levine, supra note 201, at 722.
212 Summary Analysis of S. 2551 by the CAB, 1976 Hearings, supra note 21,
at 425.
l'S. 3930, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(b)(2) (1976). This proposal entirely
eliminates agreements affecting domestic transportation from any filing require-
ment, leaving the Justice Department with total responsibility in this area.
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air transportation. This failure is indicative of the power of the in-
ternational airline cartel and highlights the prominence of foreign
policy considerations in this area of airline regulation.
4. Immunity
All of these proposals limit the antitrust immunity conferred by
CAB approval of agreements under section 412. The Cannon pro-
posal is the weakest; it retains the present standard for agreements
under section 412."' The Ford plan allows antitrust relief only in-
sofar as may be necessary to enable the party to do anything "in air
transportation" authorized, approved, or required by CAB order.21
A similar standard proposed by the CAB allows immunity as to
"transactions specifically approved by the Board---or those transac-
tions necessarily contemplated thereby," and provides that the CAB
"may specifically define and limit the scope of the relief granted.' '..
The section conferring antitrust immunity in the Kennedy plan
would be effective for only ten years; it uses the same standard as
that in Ford's bill and specifically provides that no approval granted
within this ten year period will provide immunity beyond that
time.2
17
The provisions of three of these bills similarly restrict the im-
munity for control relationships approved by the CAB and, further-
more, provide no immunity from attack under Section Two of the
Sherman Act. ' These proposals recognize and try to strengthen the
presently inadequate judicial control over anti-competitive practices
in the airline industry. They provide supplemental air carriers (and
others) a greater opportunity to challenge agreements sponsored by
the IATA and a better chance of success.
5. Restatement of Public Policy
The disparity between the proposals concerning domestic avia-
tion and those concerning foreign air transportation is crystallized
by the various proposed restatements of the public policy which
the CAB must review when considering if a particular action meets
214 S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(c) (1976).
215S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1975).
2 16S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1976).
217S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. S 494 (1976).2 18S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 11(c), 13 (1975); S. 3364, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 494 (1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (1976).
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the "public interest" test.
The CAB plan and the Cannon bill are substantially identical."'
These bills separate the policy statement into two parts: the first
part deals with interstate and overseas air transportation, the other
half concerns foreign air transportation. The policy for domestic
commerce is revised to include "the phased and progressive transi-
tion to an air transportation system which relies on competitive
market forces," promotion of entry of new carriers, and provision
for "low-cost services,"' or services "responsive to the diverse
needs" of the public."' In contrast, with respect to foreign air trans-
portation, these proposals suggest no change in the present policy
statement. This policy includes regulation "to recognize and pre-
serve the inherent advantages of, . . . and foster sound economic
conditions in" such air transportation."'
Certainly there are a host of characteristics which distinguish do-
mestic from international air transportation. International practices
must accommodate the diverse interests of other sovereign states.
Private United States companies compete with foreign government
enterprises in many markets. Tariffs are set by the IATA subject to
governmental approval. Some foreign states, seeking foreign ex-
change rate earnings from United States tourists, underwrite their
national air carrier's losses in order to maintain large capacities to
the United States. In short, competition is limited by government
policy in most countries."' In embracing a "live and let live" atti-
tude towards the international airline cartel, these proposed bills,
purporting to foster sound economic conditions are relying on a
policy statement written thirty-seven years ago in the context of an
infant industry in need of protection-a policy which has been used
by the CAB on many occasions to limit rather than foster competi-
tion."
The Kennedy plan proposes a workable policy goal which inte-
grates these competing concerns. It declares one policy for all air
"IS. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976); S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 5 (1976).
22S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
2'1 S. 3536, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
2"49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
22 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 638.
I"4See Snow, supra note 157, at 649.
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transportation, striving for increased competition domestically, and
providing in the foreign area for: "regulation in a manner that en-
courages to the extent practicable maximum reliance on price and
service competition in foreign air transportation, with appropriate
recognition of the differences between interstate and overseas air
transportation on the one hand, and foreign air transportation on
the other.M
25
This statement at least suggests an endorsement of the CAB's
restrictions on air carrier permits in cases where the tour operator-
applicant is affiliated with a foreign air carrier. One obvious weak-
ness is that the CAB maintains discretion to revert to its old prac-
tices if it concludes that competition in this area is not "practica-
ble." However, one must read this statement together with the other
substantive provisions of the Kennedy plan; considering the limited
antitrust immunity,' the strict standard for approval of inter-carrier
agreements, 7 and the ultimate goal of deregulation within ten
years, 8 this bill would significantly enhance competition in the
foreign, as well as the domestic, transportation market.
The Ford administration bill contains the broadest statement of
policy, including "maximum reliance on competitive market forces
and on actual and potential competition to provide the needed air
transportation system. '21' This policy statement strengthens the bill's
provision on approval of inter-carrier agreements since the CAB
must evaluate such agreements in terms of the public interest, using
this policy statement as the standard. The policy statement also
limits the impact of the related immunity provision since competi-
tive concerns pervade the factors the CAB must weigh before grant-
ing its approval order. By expanding the public interest in compe-
tition, the CAB is also given greater authority to investigate various
methods of competition and to condemn them as unfair if neces-
sary. Thus, if the CAB fully exercises its powers in conformity with
this standard, competition in foreign air transportation to and from
the United States is a likely prospect-and a welcome one.
A comprehensive legislative solution to the problem of vertical
2"S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 103 (1976).
2  Id. 5 455.
,7 Id. 5 492.
228 Id. 5 494.
"2S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 4 (1975).
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integration would include the following provisions:
1. A definition of "charter transportation" which refers to bulk
or group transportation;
2. A prohibition of domestic airline/tour operator affiliations;
3. Prohibition of foreign air carrier use of tour affiliates when
marketing tours which originate in the United States;
4. Permission for supplemental carriers to market tours directly;
5. Strict standards against which inter-carrier agreements must
be measured before approval by the CAB; notice to and evaluation
of such agreements by the Attorney General;
6. Elimination of antitrust immunity for intercarrier agreements;
and
7. A public interest standard which emphasizes low fares and in-
creased service while recognizing the distinctive features of foreign
air transportation.
Although none of these proposals incorporates all of these pro-
visions, the Kennedy Plan, in particular, includes most of them.
Thus, a congressional response to at least some of the problems in
this area is a distinct possibility.
Even the most comprehensive legislation would not be the
ultimate solution. The United States must also work within the ex-
isting IATA framework to promote increased competition for
group transportation services on scheduled flights. In addition, it
must independently promote the competition offered by United
States and foreign charter airlines. Success in all of these areas
would result in a greater variety of low cost tours and a more com-
petitive foreign air transportation service.
V. CONCLUSION
The South Pacific market is in its formative stages. Because Aus-
tralia is a country without a large population and with no strong
ethnic colonies in the United States, the tourist interest in Australia
is very general without the "immediate draw" of other destina-
tions. ' However, passenger traffic in this market has increased sub-
stantially over the past few years. For this year, a growth of ten
per cent in passenger traffic originating in the South Pacific is anti-
, 'John Rowe, Regional Director of Tours for the Americas, Qantas Airways,
Transcript, supra note 70, at 1203-04.
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cipated."'
In the past, foreign air carriers were disinterested in the charter
field, so most charter service was provided by United States air car-
riers. The small number of firms in the market and their limited
diversity of interests provided an opportunity for restrictions on
United States operations-by restricting landing rights-in re-
sponse to competitive or expansionist aviation policies of United
States air carriers. 
2
The market now supports five scheduled carriers and two supple-
mental airlines,' and, with the growth in the market, there has been
an increased demand for charter tours. Most of the scheduled air-
lines perform some tour operations, and eight to ten tour operators
offer tours in this region.' As evidenced by the actions of Qantas,
competition for this increased passenger traffic is growing.
Qantas entered the tour business so that it could more economic-
ally operate-and more fully exploit-this growing demand for
tour services. Once an airline institutes a system that places it at a
competitive advantage vis-a-vis its competitors, the competitors feel
compelled to diversify as well, and pressure becomes intense to per-
mit them to do so.' The result of such diversification, however,
would be competition in the tour operating business, and, perhaps,
in the charter field as well. The other scheduled carriers would es-
tablish "in house" tours with the same favored position which Qan-
tas Holiday Tours enjoyed.' Coupled with the degree of market
power these airlines already command, diversification could serve
231 Letter from Nolan Hill, Director of Advertising & Sales Promotion for the
Pacific, Pan American Airlines, Feb. 28, 1977. See generally Transpacific Route
Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 161 (1969).
'
3 2 STRASZIEIM, supra note 199, at 219-20.
233 Qantas, British Airways, New Zealand Airlines, Pan American and Union
de Transportation Airlines were the scheduled carriers at the time of the suit.
Memorandum of Law, supra note 60, at 6. At the present time, Canadian Pacific
has replaced British Airways in this market. OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE, WORLD-
WIDE ED. (1976). World Airways and Trans International Airlines are the sup-
plemental carriers certificated in this market. STRASZHEIM, supra note 199, at
219-20.
21McGhettigan's Travel Agency, Ruth Castle. These include: Tourwinds,
Brendans, Percival, Maupin, Travcoa, Lisland, Australian Travel and Foremost.
" See Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monopoly Policy upon Multi-product
Firms, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 320, 362 (1950); see also Danna v. Air Fr., 463 F.2d
407, 413 (2d Cir. 1972), for a discussion of diversification in the context of fare
discrimination.
- Pan American has already done so.
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as a basis for undesirable pricing practices and might permit an at-
tempt to monopolize the tour operating business." 7 Many independ-
ent tour operators could not withstand the resultant competitive dis-
advantages, and since the supplemental airlines cannot integrate
vertically in this way, these smaller airlines will be faced with a hard
competitive struggle with the larger scheduled carriers for the re-
maining charter business. Ironically, all of this would occur in re-
sponse to pressure for lower rates for the general public.
Any recommendations made in this area must be tempered by
consideration of their subsequent international repercussions. Inter-
national aviation policies are a mix of economics and applied di-
plomacy."8 External market effects include balance of payment ef-
fects, the attraction of trade, tourism, and investment, and the po-
litical prestige of showing the flag.' Any unilateral action by a gov-
ernment to impose its interpretation of the public interest on all
airlines is "hardly likely to be successful; even if that interpretation
is impeccably correct."'"
The IATA, however, has successfully imposed its own concept
of the public interest, one which favors economic protection of the
sovereign flag carriers, on the United States markets for decades.
The administrative, executive, and legislative actions which are rec-
ommended in this paper would merely establish the United States'
concept of the public interest for its own market air transportation
services which originate in the United States. Enforcement of this
concept would strengthen charter services, promote flexibility in the
industry, and foster innovations in the market. Above all, these poli-
cies would promote the interests of the airline passengers-not
merely the interests of the flag carriers which serve them.
ADDENDUM
None of the bills discussed in this article were reintroduced be-
fore the 95th Congress. Two new Senate bills, S. 292 and S. 689,
are now in committee. An additional legislative proposal is current-
ly being drafted by members of the House of Representatives. Un-
237 Further distortion occurs where nationally owned airlines-such as Qantas
-receive large operating subsidies.
2
3 8 SsRASZHIM, supra note 199, at 3.
2 Id. at 2.
nId. at 195 (quoting WHEATCROFT, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 85 (1964)).
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fortunately these new bills are not as promising as some of their
predecessors in resolving the problem of air carrier control of tour
operations in foreign air transportation.
Senate bill S. 689, introduced by Senators Cannon and Kennedy,
is a compromise of the positions contained in their original propos-
als. This bill contains definitions of "charter air transportation" and
"charter trip" which permit direct sale to the general public; how-
ever, charters are again defined to include only planeload fRights!1
The bill provides for increased charter flights by scheduled carriers,
but then imposes a percentage limitation based on the number of
miles flown by any particular carrier No new powers are proposed
for tariff review. No new standards for approving inter-carrier
agreements in foreign air transportation are mentioned, and the
antitrust immunity conferred by such approval is not limited. The
public interest standard contained in this bill is identical to that
now in the Act.' If this bill becomes law, the present policies of the
CAB will continue, without any Congressional direction. In addi-
tion, this bill eliminates Presidential review of CAB orders in for-
eign air transportation." In so doing, the "alternative avenues for
relief" in this area are drastically reduced.
Senate bill S. 292, introduced by Senators Pearson and Baker,
contains provisions which are more responsive to the problems dis-
cussed in the article. Its provisions defining charter transportation
are similar to those in S. 689. It fails to propose changes in the
limited power of the CAB to review tariffs in foreign air transpor-
tation, but it specifically limits the immunity granted by CAB order
to the "transaction specifically approved ... or those transactions
necessarily contemplated thereby," and allows the CAB to de-
FOOTNOTES FOR ADDENDUM
1 S. 689, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(c) (1977).
2 ld. S 10. The limitation may be increased in cases where the CAB finds it
is "in the public interest."
3 1d. §§ 18(c), 18(d).
4 Id. S 5.
I d. § 20. A similar provision appeared in S. 3830, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 14
(1976). For a Statement favoring this position see Hearings on S. 2551 Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Commerce Comm., 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 807 (1976).
IS. 292, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 3(2), 6(f)(5) (1977).
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fine and limit the scope of relief granted.! In contrast to S. 689,
this bill strengthens the role of the President by specifically provid-
ing that licenses for foreign as well as domestic charter flights shall
contain terms and limitations "which are directed to be included by
the President upon his review."'
Most significantly, the public policy definition represents a strong
declaration of the public interest with respect to foreign air trans-
portation. It stresses the need for developing a foreign air transpor-
tation system conducted by privately owned and operated air carri-
ers. "Market realities" such as government ownership of foreign
flag carriers, restrictive foreign laws, and the inability of individual
carriers to determine rates and capacity are listed as "inherent dif-
ferences" between domestic and foreign air transportation.! Such an
explicit policy statement, if incorporated into law, would direct the
CAB to scrutinize inter-carrier agreements more thoroughly and
would encourage the CAB to investigate and regulate unfair meth-
ods of competition more extensively. If the CAB responds to this
Congressional directive, some of the problems in this area may at
least be controlled, if not resolved.
7 Id. S 12.
'id. 5 6(f)(6).
91Id. § 4.
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